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Abstract 
 
Rival firms produce products with a multitude of characteristics 
(Lancaster, 1966) and consumers choose to purchase those products 
that most closely match their ideal set of characteristics.  Orthodox 
production theory ignores the view that products are bundles of 
characteristics and consequently it offers no analysis of how to divide 
limited production budgets between different characteristics.  It also 
ignores the heterogeneity of firms with respect to their capabilities 
(Penrose, 1959, Richardson, 1972) and the fact that production 
decisions are undertaken in historical time (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Each of these factors has implications for the firm’s feasible productive 
set at any point in time and its production strategy.  Here a new 
framework of analysis of production is offered which incorporates 
these missing features.  In addition it incorporates lessons from 
behavioural consumer economics (Earl, 1986), which recognises the 
possibility that consumers may have hierarchical preferences over 
characteristics, rather than trade-offs between them, and that they will 
form aspiration levels for each characteristic in terms of actual or 
perceived performance.  
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1 Introduction 
This paper reworks some familiar tools from orthodox equilibrium 
economics and integrates them with inputs from evolutionary 
economics to deal with some issues that emerge as significant once it 
is accepted that actual economies are evolving in historical (real) time. 
Orthodox production theory essentially reduces to a problem of choice 
involving a menu well-known alternative techniques relating input 
combinations to output levels of given products, subject to particular 
unit prices for the inputs. The following topics are typically beyond its 
purview: 
 
· Innovation - the set of products that may be produced is not 
static (Schumpeter, 1934). 
· Knowledge - the accumulation of capital by firms does not take 
place in the context of a given state of technological knowledge 
with a pre-specified set of blueprints from which to choose. 
Rather, firms keep developing new, more productive techniques. 
Hence, ‘The blueprints are drawn when the technique has been 
chosen, and it will rarely turn out, after the event, that exactly 
the best possible choice was made’ (Robinson, 1975, p. 39). 
· Learning - even where no new investment is made in terms of 
expenditure on capital equipment or spending on training staff, 
productivity may increase as time passes due to learning effects 
(Wright, 1936). 
· Capabilities - firms differ in what they can do in terms of 
productivity or the product characteristics they can produce for a 
particular outlay (Penrose, 1959, Richardson, 1972, Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). 
 
In particular, orthodox production theory sits uneasily with a 
capabilities perspective in which specialisation and learning play a 
central role and give rise to heterogeneous capabilities which heavily 
influence the costs that firms will incur if they choose to shift from one 
production technique to another (as well as possibly limiting their 
ability to make any shift). An issue of major significance is the 
possibility of non-substitution between capabilities (i.e. production 
systems that involve prerequisites and co-requisites), especially in 
markets where, as suggested in heterodox consumer theory, many 
buyers are using decision rules based on checklists or priority 
rankings, and competitive pressure is leading to rising standards being 
required (the ‘Red Queen Principle’ from evolutionary theory (Van 
Valen, 1973)). Path dependence is also a key issue: where investment 
is funded from profit plough-back, cash-strapped firms will tend to get 
locked into ultimately futile attempts to upgrade by incremental rather 
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than radical changes in the products they offer. We will attempt to 
show how production theory looks when it embraces such issues. 
 
2 The shape of consumer preferences 
Despite Chamberlin (1933) having made the specification of the 
product a decision variable in his Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 
and despite forty years passing since Lancaster (1966) used tools from 
mainstream consumer and production theory to remodel consumer 
demand in terms of product characteristics, expositions of production 
theory typically proceed as though the product in question is given. An 
important exception to this is the work of Grupp and Maital (2001), 
who try to apply standard microeconomic tools to the task of choosing 
where a firm might best devote its research and development efforts. 
In their ‘features-based approach to innovation’ they focus on the 
costs and benefits of developing new products (or improving existing 
products) to comprise one bundle of characteristics rather than 
another. 
 The approach taken by Grupp and Maital can be characterised as 
follows: 
 
1. For each product characteristic, assess how the firm’s existing or 
imagined product performs on a ‘technometric’ reference scale, 
its value lying between 0 (the worst performance offered by an 
existing rival) and 1 (the best performance currently available in 
this product dimension). 
2. Find out the importance that prospective buyers attach to 
particular features, or their willingness to pay for them, using 
hedonic price equations or conjoint modelling. 
3. Estimate the inputs required to make incremental improvements 
for each of the characteristics offered by the product and then 
use programming methods to find the optimal allocation of the 
resources available for getting the best ultimate design of 
product in terms of the cost of making improvements and the 
revenue benefits from making them. 
 
As well as looking at the overall market, with a focus on average 
ratings of customer’s for particular features, Grupp and Maital also 
show how this line of thinking may be applied to market niches where 
groups of customers cluster with similar sets of preferences. 
The use of the 0,1 technometric scale for each product 
characteristic is ingenious. It means that Grupp and Maital are able to 
present visual summaries of the ‘profiles’ of rival products in just two 
dimensions even though the products themselves may have a couple 
of dozen dimensions of interest to customers. Their profile diagrams 
 4
use the 0,1 scales as their vertical axes and then line up the average 
customer ratings of the importance of product characteristics on the 
0,1 scale beginning with the highest on the left, followed by the others 
in decreasing order. This, they suggest, gives the ‘customer preference 
profile’ (see Figure 1 below for an example). For each product in the 
market a technometric profile can also be drawn with its actual 
performance on each characteristic, measured on a 0,1 scale mapped 
against the respective importance rating assigned by customers.  
The obvious thing for the firm to try to do, costs permitting, is to 
come up with a product whose technometric profile aligns with or is 
consistently above the customer preference profile. It is where 
resources are restricted, as will normally be the case, that the firm will 
need to make choices about which areas of its product to try to 
improve, given the resources at its disposal, and this is where Grupp 
and Maital’s cost-benefit/programming approach is intended to help. 
From the heterodox standpoint, there are two limitations with 
Grupp and Maital’s extension to mainstream microeconomic analysis. 
One, which we try to deal with later in this paper, is their tendency to 
assume linearity in product development processes and hence point in 
the direction of using linear programming as the means of finding the 
optimal product development strategy. The other issue is the 
presumption that customers are always willing to make trade-offs, 
linear or otherwise. This is at the heart of the demand modelling 
methods that are used in their work. From the heterodox standpoint 
(e.g. the perspective of behavioural consumer economics), however, it 
is possible that many potential buyers will approach the task of 
choosing by using a checklist that defines a required performance 
template, or by setting targets for performance levels (i.e. forming 
aspiration levels (Simon, 1955)) on each characteristic, ranking these 
characteristics in order of priority and opting for the product which 
gets as far down this list as possible without failing at least to match 
the aspiration levels recorded in what we call the ‘customer aspiration 
profile’ (see Bettman, 1979; Earl, 1986, 1995). 
Figure 1 revisits Grupp and Maital’s product profile idea from the 
checklist/priority standpoint. It shows a hypothetical customer 
aspiration profile for small cars and how two brands fare against it. 
Brand A beats brand B on only five of the eleven characteristics shown 
and is vastly inferior in terms of the fourth-ranked characteristic, 
safety, where it falls short of the typical customer’s aspirations. 
However, while brand B is in many senses a more rounded performer 
and meets safety aspirations, it would be beaten by brand A because it 
falls short of the market’s demanding standards in terms of styling, 
which is ranked above safety at number 2. A suitable appealing restyle 
of brand B would enable it to beat brand A, unless brand A’s safety 
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rating were improved, in which case brand B’s cramped interior lets it 
down at the seventh hurdle. If brand B were both restyled and 
repackaged in terms of its interior to meet customers’ aspirations, the 
decisive test would then become that of the quality of finish, where 
neither presently is up to scratch but where A is the less bad of the 
two, so A would win.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Hypothetical Profiles for Small Cars 
 
 
In terms of a hierarchical view of preferences, we can see that 
brand A’s manufacturer would be making a serious error if it reacted to 
a loss of sales caused by improvements in brand B’s styling by 
concentrating on improving its ride quality and finish, and not 
addressing the safety issue, even if these were areas where market 
research indicated it was failing to make the grade. 
In the diagrams and analysis in the rest of the paper we are not 
using the technometric scales approach to show product 
characteristics. Instead, our characteristics axes will begin with the 
level of performance the firm is currently offering on that dimension 
(which in some cases might be zero) and then are open-ended, in 
whatever units the firm might be using to measure its product’s 
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performance in that area. This approach enables us to focus on the 
expected costs and revenue gains of improved performance in a 
particular dimension without the analysis being clouded by 
investments already made to bring the firm to a particular level of 
performance if that lies between best-practice and worst performance 
of rivals. It also makes it easier to apply the analysis to cases where 
the firm in question sets out to offer a better performance on the 
dimension than has previously been offered. (In terms of a 
technometric scale, the firm’s new product would become ‘1’ on the 
scale and lower values would have to be assigned to all of its rivals 
aside from the worst one, which would remain at ‘0’.)  
Grupp and Maital’s approach does not direct attention at the 
possibility of a firm trying to do this, because they presume customer 
demands will be somewhat less than the existing best practice. 
However, it is by no means uncommon for firms to set out to ‘rewrite 
the rules of the game’ and ‘provide a new benchmark’ for products in 
their class by demonstrating to potential customers that they can 
demand more than they have been used to without making sacrifices 
on other dimensions in order to get it. A case in point is the 1983 Audi 
100, whose use of devices such as flush glazing to engineer a 
spectacular increase in large-car fuel economy was widely copied. Not 
only could buyers now realistically hope to achieve an average fuel 
consumption figure of at least 30mpg, but for a time, firms started 
competing, in their advertising, in terms of a possible new decision 
criterion, namely whether a car (like the Audi) had a drag coefficient of 
0.3 or less. 
Before moving on, it is important to add that the question of how 
to measure performance in a particular dimension is often far from 
straightforward. In the case of car safety, for example, it is important 
to know whether customers are setting their aspiration levels in terms 
of, say, laboratory scores achieved in crash testing programmes such 
as EuroNCAP, or more likely, in terms of published summary star-
ratings or in terms of the number of airbags, or in terms of rating 
systems based on actual accident outcomes. Such systems may 
produce quite different rankings of rival products and have very 
different implications in terms of the costs of re-engineering one’s 
product to meet them—for example, it will be far cheaper to add side 
airbags than re-engineer the body structure so that it can better 
withstand a side impact. 
 
3 Revenue profiles for improvements in characteristics 
Given the mix of decision rules that potential customers are using, 
there will be a separate demand function for each combination of 
characteristics that the firm may offer. However, we can also imagine 
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the firm looking at the revenue it may get by increasing how much of 
a characteristic it offers whilst keeping the other characteristics 
constant. With a given price and given other characteristics, the firm 
will have conjectures about the impact of changes in a characteristic 
on its sales volume and hence on its revenue. Clearly, we can draw 
graphs of these ceteris paribus characteristic improvement/revenue 
improvement relationships. However, if we are trying to understand 
the maximum it would be worth spending on improving performance 
on a characteristic, what we really need to graph is the relationship 
between the change in a characteristic and the maximum increase in 
net revenue that it is possible to generate for each possible level of the 
characteristic over the time horizon in question (such as the expected 
life-cycle of that variant of the product). In this instance, what we 
mean by ‘maximum net revenue’ is the outcome of calculating the 
optimal combination of increase in price and increase in quantity less 
the increase in total (variable) costs of offering more units of the 
product in ceteris paribus terms.  
To make this point clearer see the example in Figure 2. Imagine 
a carmaker in the early 1990s, considering whether to add a driver’s 
airbag to one of its products. From its market research, the firm will 
have an idea of how much the demand curve for its product will shift 
to the right in going from zero to one airbag without changing any of 
its other features. It should also be able to estimate the marginal cost 
of supplying extra cars without any airbags. From orthodox pricing 
analysis in terms of MC=MR, there will be a price that maximises 
profits as if the airbags had been included at zero cost to the firm. The 
increase in net revenue compared with the no-airbag case is then the 
maximum amount that the firm could spend on adding the airbag to 
the total number of vehicles sold without it reducing its profits. For 
example, suppose the relevant figures are: optimal price without 
airbag $20,000 and sales quantity 230,000 units; price with an airbag 
$20,750 and sales quantity 235,000 units. If the unit costs per vehicle 
without an airbag are $15,250,1 then the impact on net revenue is 
($20,750 X 235,000) – ($20,000 X 230,000) – ($15,250 X 5,000) = 
$200m, i.e. $851.06 per car sold. It can go through the same thought 
experiment in terms of adding both driver and passenger airbags, and, 
yet again, side airbags and so on, with each addition moving the car’s 
demand curve further to the right.  
The set of results from such thought experiments comprises 
what we call the ‘revenue gain envelope’ for this characteristic. It is 
what the firm will need to focus on when deciding on the specification 
to try to offer for the product. Figure 3 contrasts orthodox and 
                                                 
1 We have assumed constant unit costs in figure 2 to simplify the analysis.  
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heterodox perspectives on the likely shape of the relationship between 
improvements in performance and improvements in revenue. Revenue 
is shown on the vertical axis and the horizontal axis represents the 
level of the characteristic being offered. This analysis is presented on 
the assumption of a particular set of performance levels on all the 
other characteristics. We consider later in the paper the economics of 
juggling the mix of two characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Calculating the maximum amount to spend on 
improving/adding a single given characteristic ceteris paribus 
 
 
In terms of conventional thinking, the kind of revenue 
improvement envelope that we should expect managers to envisage is 
a line that begins at the bottom-left and rises to the right, either as a 
sloping straight line (implied via a standard linear hedonic regression 
model), or with a decreasing slope (implied by a diminishing marginal 
utility/rate of substitution between this characteristic and others). 
However, if the market (whether as a whole or in particular segments) 
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is populated mainly by customers who are setting targets and are 
unwilling to settle for less, and if these customers are setting similar 
targets, this will produce revenue profiles for product characteristics 
very different from what the orthodox analysis would lead us to 
expect. From the heterodox standpoint, what we should expect is an 
S-shaped curve. A little of the characteristic attracts virtually no extra 
customers compared with not offering the feature at all. Adding more 
of the characteristic wins a few extra sales, from customers who are 
choosing in the orthodox manner, but when the commonly-demanded 
target level of performance is offered, sales and revenue sky-rocket. 
Further increases in performance on this dimension may also increase 
revenue, both from customers doing trade-offs and from customers 
with heterodox preferences who use dominant performance on this 
characteristics as a tie-breaker, or who are prepared to make trade-
offs between characteristics once they are in their target area for all 
‘must-have’ features. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Revenue impacts of changes in the amount of a 
characteristic offered 
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With these S-shaped characteristic-revenue curves, the height of 
the ‘sky-rocket’ middle section will depend on the ranking of the 
characteristic. If many consumers rank it first in priority, or it is one of 
a ‘core’ checklist group, then if the product performs adequately in the 
other dimensions, meeting the target figure on this dimension may be 
all that is needed to unleash a flood of demand, but without this most 
customers will reject it. With lower priority characteristics, the revenue 
impact of coming up to the target will be rather limited unless a 
shortfall means the product is one characteristic behind some of its 
rivals in terms of the number of hurdles it gets over. Reaching the 
target may give it a chance at a tie-break or may enable it to win 
because it fills a gap in the list of tests the product can pass and 
buyers who choose it can go on to meet targets further down the list 
that they cannot meet if they choose a rival brand. 
It is important to recognize that these revenue curves will move 
to the right as time passes. This is because the average performance 
of each characteristic will tend to improve and with it the aspiration 
level that customers set. For example, in the late 1990s, dual airbags 
might increasingly have been the aspiration level on a car, whereas 
nowadays not having six may well be frowned upon by a large part of 
the potential market. 
 
4 Capabilities and product development costs 
We now explore the costs that the firm’s managers may consider as 
they investigate how far to go in improving the performance of their 
products. In the short run, when the management team cannot 
change some of the resources at their disposal, attempts to increase 
the output of particular product characteristics may run into steeply 
diminishing returns, or even hit a performance ceiling. In terms of the 
capabilities approach to the firm, the problem here typically is not 
merely that some of the assets the team is currently stuck with are 
specific to other uses but that they do not have access to resources 
capable of performing functions needed to get the product’s 
performance up to the next level and beyond (so they face dynamic 
transaction costs which are ‘the costs of not having the capabilities you 
need when you need them’ (Langlois and Robertson, 1995, p.35)). 
Specific capabilities may be required to solve particular product 
development problems—in much the same way as particular sets of ‘A-
level’ grades are prerequisites for entering particular universities and 
degree programmes. Even if a management team spends heavily on 
buying talented staff it may still fail to hire those who know what 
members of their better-performing rivals’ teams already know. 
Knowledge may be embedded in particular individuals who are unable 
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or unwilling to join the firm or it may be to some degree tacit in nature 
(see Polanyi, 1962, 1967) and difficult to transmit to other members of 
a product development team.  
For each characteristic, the managers may be in a position to 
estimate the costs of achieving particular levels of performance within 
a target time period (such as by the time they launch their next 
generation model two years from now). These costs comprise: 
 
1. Fixed costs of research and development; 
2. Fixed costs of tooling up to incorporate the performance 
improvement; 
3. The sum of variable costs that would need to be incurred at 
the revenue-maximising sales level the firm expected to 
achieve if this product specification were offered. 
 
In terms of our airbag example from the previous section, the 
numbers might stack up as follows. Estimates for the development 
cost might be, say, $25m, the tooling costs $10m and the total 
variable costs, at $250 extra per car would be ($250 X 235,000 = 
$58.75m), a total of $93.75m, so it would be worth going ahead given 
that the total expected net revenue gain without including the cost of 
the airbags is $200m.  
We must make two qualifications before going further. First, in 
terms of the orthodox MC=MR approach to pricing, there is clearly a 
slight contradiction in what we have been saying. The optimal price for 
a particular level of the characteristic is calculated with no allowance 
for the yet-to-be-discovered marginal cost of including it on each unit 
sold. Clearly, there will be an addition to variable costs and this will 
imply a higher price and smaller quantity if profits are to be maximized 
in terms of orthodox analysis. Once the firm has got a clear idea of the 
variable cost implication of making the particular performance 
upgrade, it could perform such calculations and change its intended 
price. However, from both a contestability perspective and a heterodox 
perspective focused on mark-up pricing, such greedy pricing may not 
be wise: if the improvement looks like it will be very profitable others 
are likely to copy it (or be working on it already!). From the latter 
standpoint, a further pricing iteration might thus be in the direction of 
a lower price, to make things tougher for rivals who do not offer this 
level of performance, not a higher one whose benefits would be very 
short-term. We recognize that either kind of iteration might make 
sense but we wish to emphasize that the approach taken here is 
offered primarily as a way through which managers can organize their 
thoughts about where and how far to improve their products. It is a 
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means of coming up with budgets within which engineers can be 
required to work. 
Secondly, heterodox economists might well be somewhat 
uncomfortable with the idea of managers being able to come up with 
estimates of the costs and revenues of taking the firm into new 
territory. For one thing, the development costs and the variable costs 
of incorporating the improvement may be interdependent: if more is 
spent at the development phase, a simpler design with fewer parts 
might be possible. With path-breaking changes involving research and 
development over a decade or more, such as the first digital cameras, 
the investments would probably be very much a leap in the dark, not 
least of all because it would be unclear who would be ‘first to market’ 
with a finished product, when that would be, and to what standard of 
performance. However, much that is new in the market is actually little 
more than new combinations of existing technologies (see Earl, 2003), 
re-engineering of someone else’s product, or incremental 
improvements. Engineers therefore ought to be able to form 
conjectures, at least of best-case and worst-case scenarios, based on 
precedents. 
For simplicity and clarity in the graphs that follow, we focus on 
single-line estimates rather than showing bands to represent the range 
between best and worst-case scenarios. Furthermore, we depict curves 
showing the costs of developing products and producing them to 
incorporate particular characteristic levels as if they have quadratic, 
exponential or logarithmic functions to reflect the diminishing returns 
to what the firm can do with its existing resources, and the ultimate 
limit within the time horizon in question. However, we suspect that in 
reality, these functions may tend to have a reverse-S-shape, implying 
that up to a point the incremental cost of improving performance on a 
characteristic falls due to learning effects and only after this point does 
it get harder and harder to eke out more performance. In the case of 
airbags for cars, for example, there were major set-up costs to 
figuring out and tooling up for the driver’s steering wheel airbag’s 
sensors and hardware, but much of this could be incorporated into the 
passenger’s airbag and seat-mounted side airbags. By contrast, whilst 
side curtain airbags could use much of the same technology, they were 
often much tougher to incorporate unless part of a major model re-
design programme that allowed a different roofline.  
In Figure 4, we plot the firm’s conjectured cost function for 
improving its characteristic performance on the same diagram as the 
‘revenue improvement function’ for this characteristic. An optimal 
characteristic level to achieve can be seen readily in Figure 4. This is 
the level at which the slope of the (increasingly upward sloping) cost 
function is the same as the slope of the revenue function. This is at 
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point m with the orthodox revenue function and point n with the 
heterodox, S-shaped function. If the characteristic’s revenue function 
is S-shaped with the ‘sky-rocket’ part of the S only sloping slightly to 
the right, and if the firm finds it something of a struggle to get much 
beyond the range within which revenue sky-rockets, then the optimal 
position will tend to be close to the level at which the upper inflexion 
point occurs. Clearly, if we had drawn the cost functions as reverse-S-
shaped, multiple solutions would be implied in first order optimisation 
against an S-shaped revenue gain function. The solution for the lower 
value of the characteristic would tell us the least profitable level of the 
characteristic to offer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Costs and revenues for improving a single 
characteristic 
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because using the resources to improve performance on lower priority 
features would have virtually no beneficial impact on revenue as 
potential buyers are rejecting the product due to its shortcomings on 
the higher priority characteristic. The investment rule would in essence 
be to allocate resources to improving product characteristics in terms 
of a priority list based upon the ranking of areas of inadequate 
performance. Thus if aspiration levels for priorities 1 and 3 are being 
met but those for 2 and 4 are not, then characteristic 2 has first claim 
on resources up to the point at which it is being met and what is left 
over should be assigned to 4 and only if any resources are left over 
after enough have been earmarked to sort out that problem area 
should any be made available for work on lower priority 
characteristics. (See also the discussion earlier regarding brands A and 
B in Figure 1.) 
 
5 Capital budgeting between rival characteristics 
The analysis in the previous section is essentially a partial treatment 
that we might think of a firm as applying separately to each 
characteristic in its product’s profile to work out the best product to 
offer within the time horizon to which it was working. It is possible to 
focus on one characteristic at a time so long as two conditions hold.  
The first is that there are no externalities between the 
characteristics in terms of how they relate to consumer 
preferences/decision rules, i.e., the product is seen simply as the sum 
of its parts without any emergent properties that depend on the parts 
being combined in particular ways. In the case of a car, for example, 
an emergent property might be its perceived ‘sportiness’, which might 
be affected jointly by the quality of its styling, the wheels fitted to it, 
its power/weight ratio, its height, and so on, in ways that were not 
simply additive. (For example, body styling that seems svelte when 
combined with upmarket alloys, fat tyres and lowered suspension 
might look somewhat ridiculous with skinny tyres on steel wheels and 
a conventional ground clearance.) 
The second condition is that there is no financial constraint to 
prevent the firm from financing all of the product improvements that it 
deems profitable. In reality, even though an improvement looks like it 
will pay for itself if undertaken, the firm may simply not have the 
resources to go ahead with it at the moment. The issue here is not 
particularly a matter of the analysis in Figure 4 being rather cavalier in 
its treatment of time—it could be made more sophisticated by allowing 
for the discounting of the stream of enhanced revenues that comes 
after the money has been spent on upgrading the product. Rather, the 
problem lies with imperfections of capital markets that result in many 
firms seeking to finance their investments from ploughed-back profits.  
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Some heterodox economists such as Eichner (1976/1980) have 
made the relationship between profits and investment central to their 
work. However, the picture they offer tends to be of firms having 
market power that they can choose to exploit today, to gain extra 
profits to do the investment they would like to undertake, but only at 
the cost of their fat profits attracting in more competitors and thereby 
reducing their market power. On this kind of analysis, there may be 
some kind of steady-state profit rate/investment relationship in which 
the investment keeps giving them enough of an advantage to keep 
their market power intact. This perspective might describe well what 
happens in some markets but the frequency of reports in the financial 
press about firms having developed the best that they could do given 
the funding they had is something that we take as implying a rather 
different situation. It is a situation more in line with Downie’s (1958) 
analysis of the competitive process in terms of a tension between the 
tendency for firms with greater market share to gobble up the market 
share of smaller rivals unless the latter could come up with clever 
enough innovations or ways of reducing their costs to restore their 
increasingly squeezed profit margins. (Somewhere between Eichner 
and Downie lies the heterodox contribution of Wood, 1975.) We might 
put it more simply, in terms that Kaldor tended use in his economic 
theory lectures in Cambridge, namely, that the dominant firm in the 
market is a price leader that can set its prices both high enough to 
generate the investment funds it requires and low enough to prevent 
its rivals from getting enough profits to do the investment they would 
like to do. (For example, consider Toyota’s position relative to, say, 
Mitsubishi in the car market.) The latter, in consequence, end up with 
products that are relatively under-developed in certain areas and 
suffer accordingly in terms of the price and market share they can 
command. Short of the ‘fear of being hanged concentrating their minds 
wonderfully’ and producing suitable rightward shifts in some of their 
characteristic development cost function, the latter will face some hard 
capital budgeting choices between improvements to rival product 
characteristics. 
This section therefore shows how the budgeting of resources 
between improvements to different product characteristics can be 
explored in graphical terms. In Figure 5, the two axes on the top right-
hand panel refer to the performance levels of two characteristics, A 
and B and the concave lines show what performance levels are 
expected to be achievable if particular amounts are spent. We call 
these lines ‘iso-development cost curves’. They could be constructed 
purely in respect of expected fixed costs of research, development and 
tooling required to bring performance to a particular level on the 
characteristic in question, or they could also be though of as including 
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the expected variable costs of building this performance into the 
volume of products that are expected to be sold at the price that it is 
optimal to charge when this performance level is offered. Given how 
we have presented the notion of a revenue gain envelope, it is the 
latter view of development costs that we have in mind here.  
For example, the firm might spend $20m improving the 
performance of its product on A and get to level A’, or spend this sum 
on B and get to B’. Alternatively, if spending $20m, it might spend 
$15m on A and get to A” and $5m on B and reach B” (in other words, 
to point T on the $20m iso-development cost curve), and so on. For 
given increments in dollars spent, the iso-development cost curves get 
closer as one moves to the right, due to the diminishing returns to 
spending on improvements within the limitations of the firm’s current 
pool of resources.  
The iso-development costs curves bow away from the origins, as 
in a typical production possibility frontier, because of diminishing 
marginal rates of transformation between the different applications of 
the resources. In the iso-development cost curves drawn in Figure 5, 
we are assuming no externality effects between developing 
performances on the two characteristics. In reality, of course, this 
might not be the case. For example, a carmaker might find that its 
attempts to improve its vehicle’s handling interfere with ride quality, 
while safety improvements add weight and harm fuel economy. In 
other areas, there might be synergistic relationships between 
improvements to characteristics: for example, heavier doors on a car 
might come about due to improving side-impact crash safety but could 
also do wonders for perceived quality of the vehicle. In the former kind 
of case, the iso-development cost lines are less bowed away from the 
origin, and in the latter case, more so. 
If customer preferences were all of the heterodox kind, with 
identical non-negotiable targets for both A and B we could show these 
requirements by a pair of, respectively, vertical and horizontal lines. 
The top right-hand quadrant from the point of their intersection shows 
the set of alternative costings for meeting/over-fulfilling both targets, 
and the iso-development cost line that just touches the point of 
intersection of the target A and target B lines shows the cheapest cost 
of meeting both targets. In the case shown in Figure 5, the firm needs 
to spend $15m on development to meet both targets at point U, which 
involves spending about $6m in improving the performance on A and 
about $9m on improving the performance on B. If the firm had only 
$10m at its disposal, it would be unable to meet both targets and 
would then need to budget depending on which of the targets the 
potential customers ranked highest. If A were ranked above B, then 
the least-bad position would be at point V, which meets target A but 
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falls short of target B. If target B were ranked higher than A, point W 
would be the least bad allocation, meeting B but falling short of A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Iso-development cost lines 
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reverse-S-shaped iso-revenue gain curves. If both envelopes were like 
the one shown for B, the iso-revenue gain curves will be convex to the 
origin. However, unlike indifference curves between characteristics, 
each iso-revenue gain line will intersect with both axes. Take the 
$50m line, for example: at the point where it intersects the A axis (at 
G on Figure 6), it shows that by offering G of characteristic A and none 
of B, then this adds $50m to revenue. By contrast, by offering H of B 
and no A, then the firm would be no worse of in revenue terms: it 
would be $50m better off in revenue than if it offered none of both A 
and B, as indeed it would be if it offered a combination somewhere 
along this line, such as K. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Iso-revenue gain curves 
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If we superimpose the iso-development cost lines for a pair of 
characteristics on their respective iso-revenue gain lines, we can 
readily see an optimal product development pathway being traced by 
the set of tangencies between the iso-cost and iso-revenue lines. 
Figure 7 provides an example of this. If the firm has only $20m to 
spend on upgrading its product, then the best allocation is at L, where 
the mix of characteristic improvements is expected to generate $30m 
extra revenue, a gain in profit of $10m. Note that if the $20m were 
spent only on improving performance on characteristic A, then this 
would only be expected to add $15m to revenue (see point M). By 
contrast, if the firm had only $10m to spend, it might still get $15m 
extra revenue and add $5m to profits by selecting point N. Compared 
with spending $20m at point L, spending $30m at point P is expected 
to increase profit by $20m, and spending $40m is expected to result in 
an extra $30m if the firm has that much to spend. If we know what 
the firm’s total development budget is, and how its total investment in 
the product can grow through time, we can see what it ought to be 
aiming to achieve as a product development trajectory as time passes 
(aside from complications cause by rising customer expectations 
leading to reduced willingness to pay for given levels of characteristic 
performances). As some stage, moving further along the set of 
tangencies that define the product development trajectory will cease to 
add to profits. If the firm has enough resources to get that far then it 
is in effect back in the situation shown in Figure 4 for each 
characteristic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  A firm’s product development trajectory 
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Some further observations are worth making at this point. First, 
it is important to remember that the iso-product development curves 
are not based on a given production function available to all firms. 
Rather, each firm will have its own set of curves, depending on how it 
sees its capabilities and one firm may expect to need to spend much 
more than another to get to a particular level of performance on a 
particular characteristic. With preferences that are predominantly as 
envisaged in orthodox theory, firms could end up following quite 
different product development trajectories. However, if the market is 
characterised essentially by preferences of the heterodox kind and 
customers are thinking in terms of a standard checklist/priority 
ranking, then firms may need to engage in mergers or strategic 
alliances to short-circuit the process of acquiring the required set of 
capabilities to produce the required mix of characteristics. 
Secondly, although this framework has been constructed to 
assist thinking about how firms choose the improvements they make 
to a single product, it can readily be adapted to apply to the problem 
of budgeting resources between rival products in the firm’s product 
range when the financial constraint is binding. In terms of a 
diagrammatic exposition for budgeting resources between two 
products, we would have axes that represent the amount spent on 
improving product A and the amount spent on improving product B. A 
family of iso-product development lines would then be drawn; these 
lines would be straight and sloping to the left from the horizontal axis 
with a 45-degree angle. The iso-revenue gain curves would be based 
on information contained in the two products’ respective product 
development trajectories (remember, these show the set of dominant 
combinations of product development spending and revenue gain). 
There will be a set of tangencies between the iso-revenue gain curves 
and the iso-development cost curves, and the firm’s development path 
for the two products should move upwards to the right along the line 
defined by the locus of these points of tangency. Economies of 
scope/synergy between the rival products would cause the iso-revenue 
gain lines to bow towards the origin. 
Thirdly, it is important to reflect on the relationship between the 
analysis offered here and Neil Kay’s (1979) book The Innovating Firm, 
which attempted to provide a behavioural theory of where 
development budgets come from and how they get allocated. The way 
in which we have presented our analysis at first sight is opposed to 
Kay’s approach, since he argues against reductionist ‘bottom-up’ views 
of resource allocation and in favour of a ‘top-down’ hierarchical view in 
which there is a hierarchy of resource allocating decisions within the 
firm, with budgets being broken down into progressively more detailed 
constructs as funds are allocated further and further down the 
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organizational hierarchy. Kay sees the firm as operating like this as a 
means of dealing with bounded rationality, for it would be a 
managerial nightmare to try to compare the payoffs of alternative 
allocation bundles that comprised vast sets of highly detailed projects 
and clearly firms do not operate like that in practice. His formal 
analysis, like ours, actually makes use of mainstream methods of 
modelling managers’ preferences. However, his is more redolent of the 
‘utility’ tree model of separable preference functions proposed by 
Strotz (1957). (Strotz adapts the orthodox model of choice to present 
shoppers as allocating money between broad spending sectors, such 
as food, clothing and so on, and then allocating those budgets 
separately, for example, budgeting food successively between meat 
and vegetables, and between different kinds of vegetables, etc.) 
Clearly, with a focus on finding the mix of improvements to 
individual product characteristics on particular products, our analysis 
may appear highly reductionist and ‘bottom-up’. However, we see our 
approach as entirely complementary with Kay’s and suggest that in 
practice what is likely to be happening is a kind of ‘looking both ways’ 
(Janus-faced) up and down process of the kind explored in the work of 
Kostler (1978) on complex systems. Our analysis is really about the 
kinds of thinking that will result in competing claims for resources 
flowing upwards in firms from those who would like to carry out 
particular projects, for example, between suspension engineers in a 
car firm and those who work on engines. Higher up in the engineering 
division, senior engineers will have to decide on how to allocate funds 
for the development of engines and suspension systems within and 
between different models in the firm’s product range in the light of 
lower-level engineers’ information about what can be achieved, and 
what the marketing staff are saying about the revenue impacts of 
making particular kinds of improvements. However, the budget that 
comes down to the engineering managers will reflect the outcome of 
higher-level resource allocation that chooses between giving money to 
engineering products for launch soon, versus marketing, versus ‘blue 
sky’ research on technologies with only vague revenue implications 
way into the future. It is the latter that Kay’s analysis covers. Once 
again, there is a link to Chamberlin’s work: we are primarily focusing 
on the product being seen as a variable, but money spent on 
engineering might instead be spent on marketing or distribution. 
Summing up so far, we have shown how rather familiar sounding 
notions of iso-cost and iso-revenue lines can be used to analyse the 
selection of what type of product to develop as a bundle of 
characteristics. Conventional marginal equalities are also implied if the 
functions are continuous, but the analysis is perfectly tractable with 
non-trade-off kinds of preferences. Firms with different short-run pools 
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of capabilities would have different patterns of iso-cost lines and tend 
to follow different product development trajectories. 
 
6 Incremental versus revolutionary technological change 
In the long run, the firm is not merely able to augment its pool of 
human and capital resource and learn how to achieve improvements in 
product volume and performance with a given technology genre; it can 
also acquire resources and knowledge that enable it to make progress 
in terms of a different technology. The analysis of how a firm chooses 
between technological pathways is basically similar to that where the 
firm shifts from one generation of product design to another, that 
involves an upfront cost to get to where it had got already using a 
different set of resources/technology, but lower marginal cost of 
enhancing performance thereafter.  
Within a dynamic analysis of production, the notion of 
diminishing returns has potential for being recast to relate not to 
diminishing returns to a fixed factor of production but to diminishing 
returns to trying to improve performance standards of an existing 
design of product or production system, keeping core features 
unchanged rather than by investing in a new generation of products 
that have, in some sense, a different core. To illustrate what we mean 
here, consider the case of a carmaker that is trying to extract more 
performance and economy from its engines. Methods of increasing 
engine performance incrementally have included the following, and 
some firms, over a decade or more will have appl ied a good many of 
them to an evolving engine design: 
 
· Rework inlet/exhaust manifolds to improve breathing 
· Increase number of crankshaft bearings 
· Increase number of cylinders (e.g. 2.0litre 4 cylinder to 2.5litre 5 
cylinder, or 3.0litre V6 to 4.0litre V8)  
· Electric cooling fan to replace belt-drive fan 
· Add contra-rotating balance shafts 
· Electronic ignition 
· Add electronic fuel injection and engine management 
· Change cylinder bore in existing block or change piston stroke. 
· Change compression ratio 
· Replace iron cylinder head with alloy head 
· Twin camshaft cylinder head 
· Go from 2 to 3, 4 or 5 valves per cylinder 
· Add turbocharger (+ intercooler) or supercharger 
· Variable valve timing 
· ‘Drive by wire’ throttle 
· ‘Displacement on demand’ for large capacity V8 engines 
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Note that these are essentially modular improvements that are 
normally not without precedent and so are capable of being reverse-
engineered. Whilst capability requirements may be new (e.g. 
electronics), the development work may be outsourced to specialists 
As examples of non-incremental changes to engine design that a 
carmaker might undertake, consider the following: 
 
· The firm’s first ‘own’ in-house engine  
· From pushrod to overhead camshaft valve actuation 
· From in-line to V-block or boxer cylinder arrangement 
· Petrol/electric hybrid 
· Diesel 
· From iron block to all-new alloy block 
· To rotary 
 
There may be precedent elsewhere within the firm’s product range, or 
scope to reduce risks by reverse-engineering someone else’s efforts. 
Although the change may be radical in terms of tooling, design 
elements may be outsourced (e.g. both Ford and Toyota have used 
Yamaha’s input on some of their high performance engines). 
A firm that is short of cash may, in the short run, be able to 
meet (some) performance goals by making piecemeal changes. 
Diminishing returns may set in as attempts to reach higher 
performance or economy standards are made, so a piecemeal upgrade 
strategy ultimately will prove more expensive. Costs of switching 
between different generations will be increased insofar as performance 
improvements/cost reductions with the older generation of technology 
were achieved by making investments in both staff training and 
equipment that were specific to that technology rather than via more 
ingenious use of general purpose machinery and tooling. A cautionary 
tale in this respect is the case of Ford and the Model-T: changing to 
the Model A involved closing the entire production line for eighteen 
months, with 15,000 machine tools being replaced and a further 
25,000 totally rebuilt (see Selznick, 1957, p. 110). Many of the case 
studies in Clayton Christensen’s (1997) bestseller The Innovator’s 
Dilemma are also consistent with the thinking explored in this section. 
Figure 8 gives a flavour of this issue in graphical terms, but to 
make the analysis more pointed we now offer a simple numerical 
example. We use three simple quadratic equations to explore the 
problem of making the best choice of time to switch between 
technology generations. In each case y refers to the cost of achieving 
a particular performance standard x on the characteristic in question. 
Generation I is common knowledge (hence the lack of a constant) at 
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the start but runs into sharply diminishing returns. The other two 
generations involve an upfront investment to develop a new 
technology but can eventually be taken to higher performance levels 
for much lower cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Costs of improving performance under incremental & 
revolutionary changes in technology. 
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7  490   426.32   414.11 
8  640   541.52   494.96 
9  810   672.38   586.59 
10  1000   818.00   689.00 
11  1210   979.28   802.19 
12  1440   1155.92   926.15 
13  1690   1347.92   1060.91 
14  1960   1555.28   1206.44 
15  2250   1778.00   1362.75 
 
Now suppose firms A and B have both invested in Generation I 
technology and have both carried on developing it as far as X=3. If 
firm B then decides to switch to Generation II to get its performance 
up to X=4 and beyond, its total cost at 4 will be higher than A 
(90+172.88=262.88). However, so long as it can keep working at 
developing the Generation II technology and shoulder any cost 
disadvantage whilst matching A in terms of performance, by the time 
they both reach X=8 its total expenditure on getting to this stage will 
now be less than Firm A (631.52, rather than 640). Clearly, if Firm A 
switches to Generation II at this stage its shareholders will never earn 
as much as those of Firm B. However, if Firm A switches to Generation 
III technology for x=9 onwards it can reduce its shareholders’ relative 
disadvantage. By x=15, Firm A’s development expenditure is 
(640+1362.75=2002.75). Firm B, having switched earlier but only to 
Generation II has incurred development costs of only 
90+1778=1868). 
By switching to the Generation III technology and skipping the 
intermediate generation, Firm A is only spending 134.75 more than 
Firm B. If Firm A had persisted with Generation I technology it would 
still have been able to reach X=15 but its costs would have exceeded 
B’s by 382. To get ahead of B by X=15, Firm A would have needed to 
make the jump to Generation III technology after reaching X=7 at the 
latest, i.e. whilst Firm B’s accumulated development costs were still 
running ahead of its own. At X=8, with the switch to Generation III, 
Firm A would have incurred total development costs of 
(490+494.96=984.96), compared with Firm B’s meagre 
(90+541.52=631.52). By x=15, Firm A’s total development costs are 
(490+1362.75=1852.75), whereas Firm B’s are (90+1778=1868). The 
smart thing, of course, would have been for Firm A to make the jump 
to Generation III technology immediately on discovering that Firm B 
had switched to Generation II, i.e., after reaching X=4. By X=15, Firm 
A’s development costs would then be merely 
(160+1362.75=1522.75). 
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These are very simple, stylised scenarios (for example, we have 
left out any discounting and we have assumed, in contrast to our 
capabilities perspective, that each firm is capable of developing a 
technology to the same cost/performance position) but they do show 
the usefulness of combining both orthodox (diminishing returns, 
though here applied to product development) and heterodox 
perspectives (deficient foresight/myopia, and path dependence). If 
firms are battling to match each other’s standards but product 
development takes place in historical time, the economics of 
abandoning commitment to one technology and trying to develop 
another with better long term prospects vary considerably depending 
on how far ahead one looks. The firm that delays switching will 
generate a better cashflow to invest in other areas initially but will 
eventually fall behind if it does not jump to an even later generation 
technology whilst rivals have yet to reap the benefits of their earlier 
switch. A focus on short-term financial performance is likely to lock a 
firm into technological backwardness. It may make sense to try to skip 
a generation in technology, but it may be necessary to do this sooner 
rather than later, particularly if there is an even more advanced 
technology to which one’s rivals might jump. This is a lesson that EMI 
learned too late with its CAT scanner technology when late-entrant 
rivals Technicare and General Electric ‘leapfrogged’ its technology and 
eventually squeezed EMI out of a market which it had created in the 
first place (Teece, 2000)). 
 
7 Conclusion 
New products typically involve using hybrids of existing technologies or 
genres to open up new possibilities or to go at least some way towards 
satisfying unmet needs (Earl, 2003). This paper, rather fittingly, might 
be seen as a new product in exactly these terms: it is intended to 
enhance understanding of the economics of product development via a 
synthesis of basic concepts and modelling tools from orthodox static, 
equilibrium-focused economics with the general vision of technological 
competition in terms of shifting aspiration levels, growing product 
sophistication and capability development from heterodox economics. 
Normally, the blending of fundamentally different ways of approaching 
economics might be seen as a recipe for disaster for at least one 
approach: a case in point might be the ‘neoclassical synthesis’ version 
of Keynesian economics, which was viewed by those close to Keynes, 
such as Joan Robinson, as ‘bastard Keynesianism’—analytically neat 
but a diversion from Keynes’s fundamental points. Here, we hope we 
have laid foundations for a win-win synthesis, not a kind of ‘bastard 
Schumpeterian economics’. 
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To be sure, the analysis may initially unsettle heterodox 
economists because the diagrams we have developed look at first sight 
suspiciously like those from mainstream texts. Well-defined lines 
clearly give a false precision. However, what we have presented is not 
designed for capturing the essence of totally unprecedented, truly 
radical product innovations where, as Foster (2005, p. 882, after 
Damasio, 1995) points out, decisions to go ahead are essentially 
emotional, with little recourse to cashflow estimates. We have merely 
been discussing product development and improvement dilemmas and 
budgeting choices where something akin to what Foster calls 
‘subjective optimisation’ can reasonably be imagined to take place 
during planning. Entrepreneurs and managers have to imagine what 
products they might come up with, what revenues they could achieve 
and how much it would cost to achieve them, at least in broad ‘order 
of magnitude’ terms. From such thoughts they can develop arguments 
to present to suppliers of finance about what they aspire to develop 
and how much it will cost to do so, or work out what to do with a 
limited development budget. The framework we have proposed is an 
abstract but potentially useful way of encapsulating the kinds of 
mental processes that they go through, or for teaching prospective 
entrepreneurs and technology managers about the kind of thought 
process they should go through when taking decisions about what 
product(s) to try to develop and where to improve existing products. 
For orthodox economists, the paper presents a variety of 
opportunities in territory that might hitherto have seemed not 
amenable to navigation via their trusted tools. For one thing, it 
provides something instantly amenable to inclusion in managerial and 
business economics teaching and yet at the same time is ripe for 
extension from our two-dimensional graphical version into an n-
dimensional mathematical treatment. It also shows that it is perfectly 
possible to use familiar tools even when picking up notions such as 
non-compensatory decision rules that are at odds with the core of 
orthodox economics, or abandoning the notion of a given production 
function. It may thus help to pave the way towards further work that 
synthesises orthodox and heterodox perspectives, rather as has 
happened with the emergence of models of bounded rationality within 
mainstream economics. If such work adds new vigour to orthodox 
writings and increases interest in heterodox approaches without losing 
key messages from the latter, then everyone should welcome it. 
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